

01211

1962/11/17

DOWNGRADE
~~SECRET~~ OADR

E 229
BIAS

~~SECRET~~
OADR

~~EXCISE~~

1 copy of each letter (to McCloskey & Stearns)
to Mrs. Hanning for
Mr. Ball -

JMR 4/18

Return to S/S
letters mentioned were
returned to Mrs. Bundy

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RELEASE ☒ EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY ☐ TS ☐ Date: 4/3/92
EXCISE ☐ DECLASSIFY ☐ TS ☐ Date:
DECLASSIFY ☐ TS ☐ Date:
DELETE Non-Responsive info. ☐ TS authority to:
Exemptions ☐ () CLASSIFY as () S or () C OADR
Exemptions ☐ () DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C OADR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by JMR DATE 4-6-88
() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
() EXCISE () DECLASSIFY in PART
() DECLASSIFY () Non-responsive info.
FOI, EO or PA exemptions (b)(1)
TS authority to:
() CLASSIFY as _____, OADR
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

ATTACHMENT 2115- W
C.A.NO 88-0034

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

November 17, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

Dear Adlai:

Here is a copy of a letter I have sent to Jack McCloy, constituting his instructions for the conversation he is to have with Kuznetsov on Sunday.

As you will see, your proposed letter to Kuznetsov was well received, but we think it would be better to await developments over the weekend before deciding just where a formal communication of this kind should fit into the scenario.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk

Attachment.

The Honorable
Adlai E. Stevenson,
US. Representative to the UN
799 United Nations Plaza
New York, New York.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB

VIEWED BY Moskowitz DATE 11/18/62

DECLASSIFIED ☒ DECLASSIFY
EXCLUDED ☒ DECLASSIFY in PART
EXEMPT ☒ From responsive info.
I, EO of PA exemptions (b)(1)

CLASSIFY TO SECRET AUTHORITY TO: OLDR
DOWNGRADE TO TOP SECRET or SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

COMMUNIST

REVIEWED BY *Maskewitz*

DATE *4/1/68*

() BELIEVED

() DECLASSIFIED

() EXCISE

() EXCISE IN PART

() DENY

() DECLASSIFY

FOI, EO OF 1980

IN AUTHORITY TO

() CLASSIFY

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DATE

November 17, 1962 date: *4/3/68*

() DECLASSIFIED TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(X) RELEASE

(X) DECLASSIFY

() EXCISE

() DECLASSIFY

() DENY

() IN PART

() DELETE Non-Responsive Info

FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions

MR. Clegg Only:

EO Citations

() CLASSIFY as () S or () C OADR

() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C OADR

Dear Jack:

I am sending you for your guidance in connection with your meeting with Kuznetsov tomorrow, copies of the most recent communications between the President and Khrushchev.

We have just had a talk about your meeting tomorrow, in the EEC Executive Committee, and the following points represent the most useful guidance for that discussion.

1. For the moment, we should continue on our present course, which is to get Soviet assurances that the IL-28's will be withdrawn in a limited period of time, in return for which we would be prepared to lift the quarantine. This does not preclude a larger package later on with additional elements thrown in from both sides. But we would much prefer to settle the bomber-quarantine deal before going on to other matters.

2. The President will be having a press conference on Tuesday. You should point out to Kuznetsov the difficult position in which the President will find himself if he has to formulate a public statement to the American people in the absence of Soviet agreement to get the bombers out of Cuba. Under these conditions, the President would undoubtedly have to say something that would call into question whether we really have a deal with the Soviets--and anything the President says along this line will hardly be helpful to Khrushchev at this juncture.

3. You should know, as the Soviets will be aware, that for the past two days we have not been making low-level flights over Cuba. While there is no objection to your using this information in the discussion, you should carefully avoid any implication that this is a guide to our future behavior, which it isn't.

The Honorable

John J. McCloy,

United States Mission to the United Nations,

799 U. Plaza,

New York, New York.

BIAS

4/18

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4. If Kuznetsov talks about the so-called "protocol" presented jointly by the Soviets and the Cubans you will, of course, say that it is obviously unacceptable, and not worth discussing. It drags in all sorts of elements that were not part of the understanding between the President and Khrushchev, and depends entirely on trustful good faith for its implementation. You might even want to remark that while it may have been necessary to co-sign this curious document in order to get Mikoyan out with a whole skin, they can hardly expect us to take it seriously.

5. The letter which Adlai Stevenson suggested might be sent to Kuznetsov is an admirably clear re-statement of the U.S. position and you may want to use the substance of it in your discussion. We have gone over it here, and done a little editing which is reflected in the copy I am attaching to this letter for your convenience. However, we think it would be best to await the results of your Sunday walking and talking with Kuznetsov, and the Soviet reply on the 11-21's before writing Kuznetsov a formal bargaining letter.

Good luck with your talk, and let us know as soon as you can of any shift you perceive in the Soviet position, particularly on the 11-21's.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk

Attachments.

Copy to: Adl. Stevenson

IC:HC:TL

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(b)(1) XAX9